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Network theory and methods are becoming increasingly used to study the causes and 
consequences of conflict. Network analysis allows researchers to develop a better 
understanding of the causal dynamics and structural geometry of the complex web of 
interdependencies at work in the onset, incidence, and diffusion of conflict and peace. This 
issue features new theoretical and empirical research demonstrating how properly accounting 
for networked interdependencies has profound implications for our understanding of the 
processes thought to be responsible for conflict behavior of state and non-state actors. 
Contributors examine the variation in networks of states and transnational actors to explain 
outcomes related to international conflict and peace. They highlight how networked 
interdependencies affect conflict and cooperation in a broad range of areas at the center of 
international relations scholarship. It is helpful to distinguish between three uses of networks, 
namely as: 1) as theoretical tools, 2) as measurement tools, and 3) as inferential tools. The 
introduction discusses each of these uses and shows how the contributions rely on one or 
several of them. Next, Monte Carlo simulations are used to illustrate one of the strengths of 
network analysis, namely that it helps researchers to avoid biased inferences when the data 
generating process underlying the observed data contains extra-dyadic interdependencies. 
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At least since the mid-1990s, dyadic data have become increasingly common in large-n 
quantitative studies (Russett & Oneal, 1999). In many ways, the research program has been 
impressive, opening new research agendas, creating new data, and generating innovative 
theories. In particular, it has been successful in directing research toward international 
relations, i.e., the interaction between specific states, rather than state behavior more 
generally. However, research designs specifying the dyad as the unit of analysis are 
characterized by a basic logical tension. On the one hand, the use of dyads reflects reality in 
that international politics is interactive, requiring the assessment of relationships in order to 
provide meaningful insights about behavior. On the other hand, the same interdependencies 
that call for dyadic research designs also extend beyond pairs of states, questioning the 
adequacy of focusing exclusively on dyads. 
Since the need to consider more complex combinations of relationships is 
acknowledged in theory, it is not clear why one could ignore this in empirical research. In 
fact, characterizing relationships in international relations by combining countries in pairs 
may not always be sufficient or warranted. For example, trade dependence is typically 
measured as the share of trade with a particular partner. Consequently, trade diversification 
can simultaneously reduce dependency—which might make conflict more likely—and 
increase trade openness—reducing the tendency for states to experience disputes. There also 
appear to be fundamental differences between the actions of a state in joining a multilateral 
military alliance, such as NATO, and a state that chose to conclude 28 separate bilateral 
defense agreements. Finally, dyadic data routinely violate the independence of observations 
assumption; for example, observations for the [USA/Germany] dyad are generally not 
independent from the [USA/France] dyad, since both dyads contain information for the USA. 
Starting already in the 1960s, and originally mainly inspired by work in sociology, 
network analysis has developed into a powerful tool for analyzing complex interdependencies 
in the international system (Mitchell, 1969; Barnes, 1969; Hafner-Burton, Kahler & 
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Montgomery, 2009; Maoz, 2011; 2012). In the beginning, however, studies were primarily 
descriptive mapping linkages among states and identifying clusters of states with dense 
network connections in the international system (Brams, 1966; Gleditsch, 1967; Skjelsbaek, 
1972; Christopherson, 1976). Only recently scholars have begun to move toward a more 
nuanced analytical approach to studying interdependence and other relationships among 
states, one that allows the behavior of one actor to be contingent on the actions of multiple 
others. In this context, researchers started to move beyond the descriptive use of network 
analysis and begun using it to measure and model complex interdependencies in a broad range 
of substantive areas. Network theory and methods help illuminate the causes and 
consequences of conflict because they allow researchers to develop a better understanding of 
the causal dynamics and structural geometry of the complex web of interdependencies at work 
in the onset, incidence, and diffusion of conflict and peace. These networked 
interdependencies have already been shown to have crucial consequences for our 
understanding of the processes thought to be responsible for the conflict behavior of states 
(Maoz et al., 2006; Ward, Siverson & Cao, 2007; Dorussen & Ward, 2008; 2010; Böhmelt, 
2009; Warren, 2010; Cranmer & Desmarais, 2011; Lupu & Traag, 2013; Kinne, 2013). 
The articles in this special issue build on these initial studies and draw on network 
theory and methods to open up new areas for research on the causes and consequences of 
international conflict in an interdependent world. Thus, they highlight how networked 
interdependencies affect conflict and cooperation in a broad range of areas at the center of 
international relations scholarship. The contributions examine the role of networked 
interdependencies across a range of topic areas, such as militarized interstate disputes and war 
(Gartzke & Westerwinter, 2016; Minhas, Hoff & Ward, 2016), international cooperation 
(Gallop, 2016; Haim, 2016), ethnic conflict (Larson, 2016), alliances (Lupu & Poast, 2016; 
Maoz & Joyce, 2016; Warren, 2016), arms transfers (Kinne, 2016), peacekeeping (Ward & 
Dorussen, 2016), human rights protection (Chyzh, 2016), international mediation (Böhmelt, 
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2016), and conflict resolution by international non-governmental organizations (Wilson, 
Davis & Murdie, 2016). They also offer a number of methodological innovations related to 
the development and application of network analysis to the study of international relations. 
 
Networks as a theoretical, measurement, and inferential tool 
We define networks structurally as sets of units (nodes) and linkages that indicate the 
presence or absence of relationships among units (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Units can be 
anything from states, rebel movements, and ethnic groups to national or international 
governmental or non-governmental organizations and even conflicts as such. Relationships 
can comprise of trade or ethnic ties, military alliances, bilateral cooperation agreements, 
United Nations roll-call votes, among many others. We examine the variation in networks of 
states and transnational actors to explain outcomes related to international conflict and peace. 
In doing so, the articles distinguish between three uses of networks and each article relies on 
one or several of these uses: 1) as theoretical tools, 2) as measurement tools, and 3) as 
inferential tools. 
 Networks can be used as a theoretical tool to account for extra-dyadic relations among 
states and other actors in the international system. Most studies of interdependence focus on 
direct relationships between pairs of actors. Scholars emphasizing the importance of strategic 
interaction have correctly pointed out that within any pair of states, the actions of one actor 
are not independent of the behavior of other actors (Signorino, 1999). Once one accepts the 
idea of the interdependence of intra-dyadic behavior, it would appear unlikely, even peculiar, 
for interdependence to terminate at the boundary of the dyad (Gartzke & Gleditsch, 2008; 
Poast, 2010). Dyads are not isolated bubbles, and what happens in one dyad is likely to be 
influenced by what happens in the other dyads as well. This, in turn, creates a complex system 
of interdependencies. In addition to higher-order interdependencies within a single network, 
interdependencies can also exist between different networks. For example, the pattern of 
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connections in the network constituted by joint memberships in intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs) that operate in issue areas outside the security domain may shape the 
decisions of states to form, maintain, or terminate alliances, in addition to exogenous 
covariates and network interdependencies within the alliance network (Westerwinter, 2016). 
Similarly, relational patterns in the alliance network may have consequences for who is linked 
to whom in the trade network (Haim, 2016). 
 Network analysis is well-suited to analyze and represent such extra-dyadic or more 
complex types of higher-order interdependence among states and to show how they affect 
international conflict and peace. By doing so, networks as theoretical tools help scholars to 
develop new arguments about the causes and consequences of war and peace, and help to 
expand and refine existing theories, such as bargaining theories of war, informational theories 
of alliances, and spatial theories of conflict onset. Largely driven by research in economics, 
strategic, game-theoretic, analyses applied to networks, so-called games on networks, have 
helped to understand the incentives for actors to make (or break) network ties (Goyal, 2007; 
Jackson, 2008). In political science, Metternich et al. (2013) have used network games to 
analyze conflict between the government and potential opposition. Network games have 
pushed rationalist explanations beyond two-actor games and highlight what information will 
be shared or held private, as well as how direct and indirect ties affect and constrain strategic 
decisions. In the special issue, Chyzh (2016), Gallop (2016), Larson (2016), and Ward & 
Dorussen (2016), all explain conflict and cooperation as equilibriums in games on networks. 
Chyzh (2016), for example, examines how states’ indirect trade relationships affect 
their domestic human rights performance and argues that there is an inverse relationship 
between indirect trade and human rights conditions, providing domestically troubled states 
with a loophole that allows them to enjoy the benefits of trade without paying the costs of 
domestic pressure for improved human rights conditions. Gallop (2016) uses the similarity of 
political institutions (political homophily) and geographical distance to explain the 
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willingness of states to develop cooperative linkages. Ward & Dorussen (2016) also postulate 
homophily—in this case of foreign policy preferences as expressed through voting in the UN 
General Assembly—as a determinant of relative contributions to UN peacekeeping missions. 
Larson (2016) argues that cross-group ties in the context of inter-ethnic rivalry do not 
necessarily promote peace. Specifically, if cross-group ties are imposed rather than developed 
organically, lack of coordination in incomplete networks can lead to protracted retaliation. In 
all these articles, network models reflect precise theoretical arguments, creating appropriate 
conditions for tests of innovative hypotheses about the diffusion of conflict and peace in the 
international system. 
Networks can also be used as a tool for measurement. Social network analysis 
provides a rich methodological toolkit for measuring various properties of individual states, 
dyads, larger groups, and the state system. Many important concepts in international 
relations—such as power, clustering, and indirect ties—are difficult to measure when states or 
dyads are examined in isolation. Measuring these concepts can become more tractable by 
using a networks approach that takes into account the broader structure of international 
relations. Maoz & Joyce (2016) employ agent-based modeling (ABM) to explore how shocks 
lead to realignment in the alliance network. They use a number of network measures to 
evaluate ‘post-shock’ connectivity and consistence at the country, dyad, and systemic levels. 
The propositions of the ABM are subsequently compared to real-world alliance data for the 
period 1816-2010. Going beyond considering bilateral alliance ties, Haim (2016) analyzes 
how the network of international political alliances influences trade flows. He includes the 
shared number of alliances and shared membership of the same alliance community in 
standard (dyadic) gravity models of trade, and reports that controlling for indirect alliance ties 
reduces the importance of bilateral ties. Lupu & Poast (2016) apply the `k'-adic procedure, 
outlined by Poast (2010), to model the formation of nonaggression pacts as a multilateral 
process. For capturing the level of threat and rivalry in the strategic environment, they use the 
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analytic density measure of recent rivalry cessation. They find that groups of states with 
greater densities of recently ended rivalries are significantly more likely to form 
nonaggression pacts. 
Gartzke & Westerwinter (2016) create a measure that combines network centrality and 
trade dependence in order to analyze how indirect asymmetric and symmetric trade ties affect 
conflict among states. The results suggest that indirect trade relationships tend to counteract 
the effects of bilateral trade relationships, weakening the pacifying effects of symmetry and 
lowering the conflict-inducing effects of bilateral asymmetry. Wilson, Davis & Murdie (2016) 
compile original data on links between international nongovernmental organizations. These 
data reveal the impact of the network of conflict resolution organizations in lowering 
belligerence among states and demonstrating the potential relevance of efforts by non-state 
actors and informal diplomatic channels to defuse or discourage international conflict. 
Finally, a third role of network analysis is as a tool for making statistical inferences 
about the determinants and consequences of conflict and peace among states. While standard 
statistical models assume that observations are independent, network statistical models, such 
as exponential random graph models (ERGMs) or stochastic actor-oriented models (SAOMs), 
relax this assumption (Snijders, 1996; Cranmer & Desmarais, 2011). Unlike conventional 
statistical techniques, these models do not only correct for non-independence, but also allow 
researchers to directly estimate complex endogenous interdependencies and to evaluate how 
these relationships affect the diffusion of conflict and peace. The inclusion of such 
endogenous interdependencies in statistical network models should be based on careful 
theorizing about the causal mechanisms that link extra-dyadic interdependencies and the state 
behavior of interest. This illustrates how the three uses of network analysis we emphasize—in 
this case networks as theoretical and inferential tool—are complementary and can strengthen 
each other. In this special issue, Warren (2016) for example, investigates the linkages between 
interstate military alliances, international conflict, and domestic democratization using a 
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dynamic co-evolutionary actor-oriented network model. Kinne (2016) uses SAOMs to study 
the effect of weapons cooperation agreements (WCAs) on the global arms trade. He analyzes 
WCAs as an interdependent network, which co-evolves with the individual-level arms trade 
activity of states where the SAOM accounts for the mutually endogenous relationship 
between WCAs and weapons flows. His analysis shows that WCAs have significantly 
increased weapons flows. Using spatial econometrics, Böhmelt (2016) investigates how 
international mediation efforts diffuse between conflicts. Focusing on ‘substantive’ ties 
between crises in the form of joint crisis characteristics, he is thus able to identify the 
mechanism by which crises, and all actors therein, are influenced by other crises’ mediation. 
Minhas, Hoff & Ward (2016) introduce tensor regression that handles the non-independence 
of observations as well as the dynamic, simultaneous co-evolution of networks. While the use 
of latent-space tensor models is still largely unexplored in political science, they hold great 
promise in analyzing the flow of cooperation and conflict in the international system. By 
further developing and applying statistical network models, the articles in this special issue 
make innovative methodological contributions to the study of international conflict and peace. 
 
Comparing statistical models: An example using international conflict 
One of the strengths of network analysis is that it helps researchers to avoid biased inferences 
when the data generating process (DGP) underlying the observed data contains extra-dyadic 
interdependencies (Cranmer & Desmarais, 2011). Like omitted variable bias creates problems 
in multiple regression analysis, extra-dyadic or higher-order network interdependencies can 
confound relationships between covariates of interest and dyadic outcome variables. In testing 
hypotheses, the failure to adjust for such confounders can result in an increased Type I error 
rate; that is, researchers will incorrectly reject the null hypothesis of no relationship more 
often than if they included the confounders. 
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We use Monte Carlo simulations to illustrate how dyadic analyses make it difficult to 
correctly estimate the effects of a DGP that involves extra-dyadic dependencies. Specifically, 
we examine type I error rates of inferences about the relationship between the dependent 
network and covariates that are correlated with elements of the DGP but not part of it. We 
also illustrate challenges in correctly estimating the coefficient values of variables that are 
part of the DGP. We use the exponential random graph model (Cranmer & Desmarais, 2011; 
Lusher, Koskinen & Robins, 2013) to generate dyadic data that also contains extra-dyadic 
interdependence structures. The data include exogenous as well as endogenous extra-dyadic 
dependencies. This allows us to discuss dyadic models that include network variables in the 
set of predictors as well as network models that also incorporate endogenous 
interdependencies within the dependent variable.1 For the purposes of illustration and to 
provide the simulation with a substantive reference point, international conflict provides the 
context for the data, but the example is hypothetical and not meant to replicate any particular 
study. 
The simulation builds on and extends the analysis of Cranmer & Desmarais 
(forthcoming) and is based on the following six steps: First, we create an undirected, binary 
exogenous network of 192 nodes (suppose these are 192 states that exist in the international 
system in a given year). We compute the degree for each node in the network and create a 
dyadic covariate that captures the higher of the two degree scores in a dyad for each pair of 
nodes in the network. This measures the exogenous network-variable part of the DGP. 
Substantively, this could for example, refer to degree in the network of military alliances, the 
network of preferential trade agreements, or the network constituted by joint memberships in 
intergovernmental organizations. 
                                                          
1
 The empirical reality that researchers encounter in their substantive domains of interest is often more 
complicated than the simple extra-dyadic interdependencies included in our illustration. While ERGMs are 
capable of incorporating a broad range of extra-dyadic or higher order dependence structures that allow 
researchers to capture more complicated interdependencies, latent space models as discussed by Minhas, Hoff & 
Ward (2016) are an alternative that can help to address some of the weaknesses of ERGMs. 
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 Next, we create a second exogenous covariate that correlates with the higher of the 
dyadic degree scores variable. For the purpose of illustration, suppose that this variable 
captures the level of democracy in a dyad. 
Third, we create an undirected, binary dependent network. Suppose that this is our 
network of conflict ties among nations. This network is produced by a DGP that includes an 
edges effect, the exogenous network variable, a 2-star effect, a 3-star effect, and an effect for 
clustering. A 2-star effect captures configurations in which a node i is directly connected to 
two other nodes j and k. A 3-star is a 2-star with an additional node l to which i is directly 
linked. The clustering effect captures the tendency of nodes in the network to form dense 
local clusters. Most simply, the tendency toward triangular closure refers to a situation where 
nodes i, j, and k are all directly connected with each other. To operationalize this effect we use 
the geometrically weighted edgewise shared partner statistic (Hunter, 2007). The vector of 
parameters that links these five effects to the probability of observing our dependent network 
is (-5.5, 0.45, 0.45, -0.25, -0.25). The parameter values are selected to avoid degeneracy. 
 In step 4, based on the dependent network, we compute another covariate that is 
correlated to the degree in the dependent network. Specifically, we generate a variable that 
correlates with the distance between the degree scores within the dyad. In the conflict context, 
this variable captures how similar two states are in terms of the frequency with which they 
engage in conflict. These four steps create the data used for the estimations and the 
comparison of Type I error rates for the variables that are not part of the network DGP but are 
correlated with its elements. We also compare bias in the coefficient estimates of the 
exogenous network variable that is part of the network DGP between ERGM and logistic 
regression models. 
Fifth, we estimate three models. The first model is a fully specified ERGM that 
includes all variables in the network DGP as well as the exogenous covariate that correlates 
with the exogenous network variable and the item that correlates with degree in the dependent 
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network. The second model is a dyadic logistic regression model containing the variable 
correlated with the exogenous network variable as well as the variable correlated with the 
dependent network degree. The third model is a dyadic logit comprising the variables of 
Model 2, but additionally the exogenous network variable. For each model, we save the p-
values of the exogenous variable that is correlated with the exogenous network variable as 
well as the p-values of the variable that is correlated with the degree in the dependent 
network. We also store the coefficient estimates for the exogenous network variable for the 
ERGM and the logistic regression model in which it is included. 
 Finally, we repeat this five-step procedure 5,000 times to produce a distribution of p-
values for each of the two exogenous predictors for each of our three models. We also 
generate a distribution of 5,000 estimated coefficients for the exogenous network variable for 
the ERGM and the logistic regression model in which it is included. 
 We use the stored p-values for the two exogenous variables to calculate Type I error 
rates for the three models at different levels of statistical significance. Figure 1 presents the 
Type I error rates generated in our simulations for the variable that is correlated with the 
exogenous network covariate. The highest Type I error can be observed for the model with 
the variable correlated with the exogenous network variable while failing to include the 
exogenous network covariate itself. Across significance levels we almost always find a 
statistically significant relationship between the exogenous covariate and our dependent 
network, although this relationship does not actually exist. The Type I error rates of the logit 
model that includes the exogenous network variable as predictor as well as the fully specified 
ERGM are considerably lower and very similar. Suppose that the exogenous network variable 
captures the embeddedness of a dyad in the alliance network and the covariate that is 
correlated with it, but not part of the network DGP, captures the level of democracy in a dyad. 
By using a logit specification that does not include the alliance network variable in our 
conflict model, we would falsely identify a statistically significant relationship between 
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democracy and conflict, although the extra-dyadic interdependencies in the alliance network 
at work in the DGP actually generate the dyadic conflict data. Only by including the alliance 
network variable (either in a logit or an ERGM model) we are able to discover that democracy 
is actually not related to conflict behavior, while alliance degrees are. 
 
 
Figure 1. Type I error rates covariate correlated with exogenous network variable. 
Calculations based on 5,000 repetitions. 
 
Figure 2 shows the results of the Type I error simulations for the covariate that is 
correlated with the degree distribution in our dependent network, but that is not itself part of 
the network DGP. Here, we find that the Type I error rates for the fully specified ERGM are 
- 13 - 




Figure 2. Type I error rates covariate correlated with endogenous network variable. 
Calculations based on 5,000 repetitions. 
 
The simulations also illustrate how the use of networks as inferential tool can help 
researchers to avoid bias in their estimates of model coefficients. Focusing on the exogenous 
network variable, we use bias and root mean squared error to compare the ability of the 
ERGM and logistic regression to recover the true coefficient that links this variable to our 
dependent network. Bias is simply the difference between the average value of the coefficient 
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estimate in our simulations and the true value of the coefficient. Root mean squared error is 
calculated as follows: 1) compute the squared difference between each simulation run’s 
coefficient estimate and the true coefficient value; 2) sum up these squared differences and 
divide by the number of simulation runs; and 3) take the square root of this average. For both 
measures, the smaller the value, the more accurate the estimation. 
 
Table I. Bias coefficient estimate exogenous network variable (true  = 0.45) 
 Estimate exogenous network 
variable estimated with 
ERGM 
Estimate exogenous network 
variable estimated with logit 
Average   0.464 0.142 
Bias 0.014 -0.308 
Root mean squared error 0.087 0.310 
Calculations based on 5,000 repetitions. 
 
Column 1 in Table I shows that estimating the effect of the exogenous network 
variable on the dependent network using the ERGM yields relatively unbiased estimates of 
this relationship. The average estimated coefficient is very close to the true value of 0.45 and 
bias and root mean squared error are small. By contrast, logistic regression on average 
considerably underestimates the effect of the exogenous network variable on the dependent 
network. This suggests that not including the extra-dyadic interdependencies endogenous to 
the dependent network produces biased estimates of the true parameter value of the 
exogenous network variable. In other words, we are likely to err in our estimate of the 
substantive relationship between the exogenous network variable and our dependent network 
if our estimation does not include extra-dyadic dependencies within the dependent network. 
The simulation illustrates that the omission of extra-dyadic interdependence structures 
from dyadic models can increase Type I errors through confounding. If seemingly exogenous 
covariates are correlated with extra-dyadic interdependence structures and included in 
statistical models without at the same time controlling for these extra-dyadic 
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interdependencies, correlation between the extra-dyadic structures and the dependent variable 
is falsely attributed to the covariate. Consequently, the statistical inferences drawn are likely 
to be biased, and the failure to include extra-dyadic interdependencies in a dyadic analysis can 
lead to biased estimates of the coefficient of interest. 
By using networks as a tool for measuring extra-dyadic interdependence structures, we 
can account for these interdependencies in our statistical models and use them as predictors of 
our dependent variable of interest. In this special issue, Haim (2016), for example, employs 
measures that capture shared alliances and alliance community membership to predict trade 
flows. He finds that the inclusion of these extra-dyadic interdependence structures in the 
alliance network has important consequences for whether we find a statistically significant 
relationship between dyadic alliance ties and trade. Furthermore, using networks as statistical 
models allows researchers to consider interdependence structures endogenous to the 
dependent network into their statistical models. On one hand, as the simulations illustrate, we 
can avoid faulty statistical inference with respect to the significance of covariates that are 
correlated with endogenous network interdependencies. We can also considerably reduce the 
bias in our estimates of coefficients values. On the other hand, network analysis makes it 
possible for researchers to substantively model the complex interdependence structures that 
are part of the network DGP. In his contribution to the special issue, Kinne (2016) provides an 
excellent example for this in the context of WCAs. 
 
Conclusions 
Conventional analyses that highlight the importance of interdependence theoretically often 
fail to include ties beyond the dyad in their empirical models, creating a gap between theories 
and empirical tests. Unlike most previous work, the contributions to this special issue take 
extra-dyadic interdependence explicitly into account and use network theory and methods to 
incorporate it, both in their theoretical arguments and in the empirical analyses. They show 
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that interdependencies of various types play critical roles as determinants for the diffusion of 
conflict and peace in international affairs, and that analyzing the complex, networked 
structure of international relations allows us to identify causal mechanisms and explain 
phenomena related to international conflict and cooperation that may have been overlooked 
by traditional models. 
The studies in this special issue also make important methodological contributions. 
The tools developed and used by the articles offer new perspectives in the exploration of 
networked interdependencies in the diffusion of international conflict and peace. They include 
stochastic actor-oriented models, dynamic models of network co-evolution, latent position 
network models, networked games, or `k'-adic analysis. Many of these methods are emerging 
tools that researchers have only recently begun to adopt in political science and to customize 
for the study of conflict and peace. 
 
Acknowledgements: We would like to thank Tobias Böhmelt, Olga Chyzh, Yon Lupu, Paul 
Poast, Henrik Urdal, Hugh Ward, and Michael Ward for helpful comments on previous 
versions of this article. All mistakes and opinions expressed are those of the authors alone. 
  
- 17 - 
References 
Barnes, John A (1969) Graph theory and social networks: A technical comment on 
connectedness and connectivity. Sociology 3(2): 215-232. 
Böhmelt, Tobias (2016) The importance of conflict characteristics for the diffusion of 
international mediation. Journal of Peace Research 53(3): XXX-XXX 
Böhmelt, Tobias (2009) International mediation and social networks: The importance of 
indirect ties. International Interactions 35(3): 298-319. 
Brams, Steven J (1966) Transaction flows in the international system. American Political 
Science Review 60(4): 880-898. 
Christopherson, Jon (1976) Structural analysis of transaction systems: Vertical fusion of 
network complexity? Journal of Conflict Resolution 20(4): 637-662. 
Chyzh, Olga (2016) Dangerous liaisons: An endogenous model of international trade and 
human rights. Journal of Peace Research 53(3): XXX-XXX 
Cranmer, Skyler J & Bruce A Desmarais (forthcoming) A critique of dyadic design. 
International Studies Quarterly. 
Cranmer, Skyler J & Bruce A Desmarais (2011) Inferential network analysis with exponential 
random graph models. Political Analysis 19(1): 66-86. 
Dorussen, Han & Hugh Ward (2008) Intergovernmental organizations and the Kantian peace. 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 52(2): 189-212. 
Dorussen, Han & Hugh Ward (2010) Trade networks and the Kantian peace. Journal of Peace 
Research 47(1): 29-42. 
Gallop, Max (2016) Endogenous network and international cooperation. Journal of Peace 
Research 53(3): XXX-XXX 
Gartzke, Erik & Oliver Westerwinter (2016) The complex structure of commercial peace 
contrasting trade interdependence, asymmetry and multipolarity. Journal of Peace 
Research 53(3): XXX-XXX 
- 18 - 
Gartzke, Erik A & Kristian S Gleditsch (2008) The ties that bias. Specifying and 
operationalizing components of dyadic dependence in international conflict. 
Manuscript: University of California, San Diego 
(http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;jsessionid=709FFAF46DEFABB56D2
A8737811135EF?doi=10.1.1.369.3381&rep=rep1&type=pdf). 
Gleditsch, Nils Petter (1967) Trends in world airline patterns. Journal of Peace Research 
4(4): 366–408. 
Goyal, Sanjeev (2007) Connections: An Introduction to the Economics of Networks. Princeton 
NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Hafner-Burton, Emilie M; Miles Kahler & Alexander H Montgomery (2009) Network 
analysis for international relations. International Organization 63(3): 559-592. 
Haim, Dotan (2016) Alliance networks and trade: The effect of indirect political alliances on 
bilateral trade flows. Journal of Peace Research 53(3): XXX-XXX 
Hunter, David R (2007) Curved exponential family models for social networks. Social 
Networks 29(2): 216-230. 
Jackson, Matthew O (2008) Social and Economic Networks. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Kinne, Brandon (2016) Agreeing to arm: Bilateral weapons agreements and the global arms 
trade. Journal of Peace Research 53(3): XXX-XXX 
Kinne, Brandon J (2013) Network dynamics and the evolution of international cooperation. 
American Political Science Review 107(4): 766-785. 
Larson, Jennifer M (2016) Interethnic conflict and the dangers of cross-group ties. Journal of 
Peace Research 53(3): XXX-XXX 
Lupu, Yonatan & Paul Poast (2016) Teams of former rivals: A multilateral theory of 
nonaggression pacts. Journal of Peace Research 53(3): XXX-XXX 
- 19 - 
Lupu, Yonatan & Vincent A Traag (2013) Trading communities, the networked structure of 
international relations, and the Kantian peace. Journal of Conflict Resolution 57(6): 
1011-1042. 
Lusher, Dean; Johan Koskinen & Garry Robins (2013) Exponential Random Graph Models 
for Social Networks. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Maoz, Zeev (2012) How network analysis can inform the study of international relations. 
Conflict Management and Peace Science 29(3): 247-256. 
Maoz, Zeev (2011) Networks of Nations. The Evolution, Structure, and Impact of 
International Networks, 1816-2001. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Maoz, Zeev & Kyle Joyce (2016) The Effects of shocks on international networks: Changes 
in the attributes of states and the structure of international alliance networks. Journal 
of Peace Research 53(3): XXX-XXX 
Maoz, Zeev; Ranan D Kuperman, Lesley Terris & Ilan Talmud (2006) Structural equivalence 
and international conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution 50(5): 664-689. 
Metternich, Nils; Cassy Dorff, Max Gallup, Simon Weschle & Michael D Ward (2013) Anti- 
government networks in civil conflicts. How network structures affect anti-
government behavior. American Journal of Political Science 57(4): 892-911. 
Minhas, Shahryar; Peter D Hoff & Michael D Ward (2016) Relax, tensors are here: Forecasts 
of dyadic conflict networks. Journal of Peace Research 53(3): XXX-XXX 
Mitchell, Clyde J (1969) The concept and use of social networks. In: Clyde J Mitchell (ed.) 
Social Networks in Urban Situations. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1-50. 
Russett, Bruce & John R Oneal (2001) Triangulating peace: Democracy, interdependence, 
and international organizations. New York: Norton. 
Signorino, Curtis S (1999) Strategic interaction and the statistical analysis of international 
conflict. American Political Science Review 93(2): 279-297. 
- 20 - 
Skjelsbæk, Kjell (1972) Peace and the structure of the international organization network. 
Journal of Peace Research 99(4): 315-330. 
Snijders, Tom A B (1996) Stochastic actor-oriented models for network change. Journal of 
Mathematical Sociology 21(1-2): 149-172. 
Ward, Hugh & Han Dorussen (2016) Standing alongside your friends: Jointly produced 
private benefits, network centrality, and the provision of troops for UN peacekeeping 
operations. Journal of Peace Research 53(3): XXX-XXX 
Warren, T Camber (2016) Modeling the co-evolution of international and domestic 
institutions: Alliances, democracy, and the complex path to peace. Journal of Peace 
Research 53(3): XXX-XXX 
Warren, T Camber (2010) The geometry of security: Modeling interstate alliances as evolving 
networks. Journal of Peace Research 47(6): 697-709. 
Ward, Michael D; Randolph M Siverson & Xun Cao (2007) Disputes, democracies, and 
dependencies: A reexamination of the Kantian peace. American Journal of Political 
Science 51(3): 583-601. 
Wasserman, Stanley & Katherine Faust (1994) Social Network Analysis: Methods and 
Applications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Westerwinter, Oliver (2016) Multiplex choices: Intra- and inter-network dependencies and the 
evolution of military alliances. Manuscript: University of St. Gallen. 
Wilson, Maya; David R Davis & Amanda Murdie (2016) The view from the bottom: 
Networks of conflict resolution organizations and international peace. Journal of Peace 
Research 53(3): XXX-XXX 
  
- 21 - 
HAN DORUSSEN, b. 1962, PhD in Political Science (University of Texas, Austin 1996); 
Professor, Department of Government, University of Essex (2009– ); current main interests: 
trade and conflict, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. 
 
ERIK GARTZKE, b. 1965, PhD (University of Iowa, 1997); Professor (2014—), Associate 
Professor (2007–2014), University of California, San Diego; has held faculty positions at the 
University of Essex, Columbia University and the Pennsylvania State University. Research 
interests primarily involve the causes of war and peace. 
 
OLIVER WESTERWINTER, b. 1983, PhD in Political Science (European University 
Institute, 2014); Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University St. Gallen 
(2016-); post-doctoral research fellow (2013-2016), University of St. Gallen; visiting fellow 
(2011), University of California, San Diego, School of International Relations and Pacific 
Studies; current main research interests: international conflict, alliances, bargaining models, 
network theory, informal institutions, and political methodology. 
